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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 __________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Plaintiffs-Appellants, Dr. Henry L. Croft, Jr., and 
Carol Croft, individually and as parents and natural guardians of 
Chynna Croft, appeal an order of the district court granting 
summary judgment for defendants-appellees, Carla Danovsky, 
Westmoreland County Children and Youth Services, and Westmoreland 
County.  We will reverse and remand. 
 I. 
 On February 1, 1993, Gerald Sopko, Assistant Director 
of the Westmoreland County Children's Bureau received a call from 
Childline, informing him that Dr. Croft was sexually abusing his 
daughter, Chynna.  Sopko was further told that the child slept 
with her parents and that she had recently been out of the house 
naked, walked to a neighbor's house, knocked on the door, and 





 Barbara Jollie, Program Director for the Assessment 
Department of the Westmoreland County Children's Bureau, assigned 
the matter to Carla Danovsky for investigation.  Danovsky, 
accompanied by State Police Trooper Griffin, went to the Croft 
home that night.  Danovsky told Dr. Croft she was investigating 
him for possible sexual abuse of his daughter based on the 
Childline report.  Dr. Croft consented to be interviewed. 
 Dr. Croft explained that Chynna had indeed, in April of 
1992, left her bed without waking her parents, gone downstairs 
and outside, and locked herself out of the house.  She then went 
to the house of her babysitter/nanny, a short distance from the 
Croft home, wearing her pajama top and holding her pajama bottoms 
with a soiled diaper inside.  He further provided Danovsky with 
the telephone number of the nanny who could verify his version of 
events. 
 Dr. Croft agreed that his daughter had seen him naked 
and that, in fact, the family vacationed in the French West 
Indies where nude beaches are routine.  Dr. Croft stated that his 
wife sunbathed nude around Chynna.  He explained that Chynna 
suffered from seizures and, although she regularly slept in her 
parents' bed so they could be nearby if necessary, she slept 
naked only rarely.  Henry and Carol Croft slept clothed.  Dr. 
Croft told Danovsky that he had applied medicinal creams to her 
vaginal area when she had a rash.  He denied sexually abusing 
Chynna.   





his home and separated himself from his daughter until the 
investigation was complete, she would take Chynna physically from 
the home that night and place her in foster care.  Dr. Croft then 
left the room and Danovsky interviewed Carol Croft while Chynna 
sat in her lap.  Carol Croft confirmed Dr. Croft's version of the 
April 1992 incident when Chynna locked herself out of the house. 
 Finally, Danovsky questioned Chynna, who also confirmed Dr. 
Croft's version of the lock-out incident.  Chynna provided no 
indication that she had ever been sexually abused.  Danovsky then 
reiterated her ultimatum, that unless Dr. Croft immediately left 
his home and had no contact with his daughter, Danovsky would 
remove Chynna from the home that very night and place her in 
foster care.  Faced with this dilemma, Dr. Croft complied with 
her ultimatum, and left his home, wife and daughter.1 
 Danovsky testified to some inconsistencies between the 
statements of the Croft parents.  She testified that Carol Croft 
said that Chynna never saw Henry Croft swimming naked, and that 
she sunbathed topless but not totally nude.  One of the parents 
informed Danovsky that Chynna never slept naked in their bed, 
while the other said she was not clothed all the time.  In sum, 
however, the differences were insignificant and reasonable under 
the circumstances.  Danovsky also testified that, pursuant to 
                                                 
     1 Defendants repeatedly have characterized Dr. Croft's 
decision to leave as "voluntary."  This notion we explicitly 
reject.  The threat that unless Dr. Croft left his home, the 
state would take his four-year-old daughter and place her in 
foster care was blatantly coercive.  The attempt to color his 





County policy, a parent accused of sexual abuse must prove beyond 
any certainty that there was no sexual abuse before she would be 
permitted to leave a child with his or her parents.  She further 
testified that if a County caseworker does not know whether or 
not the allegation is true, the child will be separated from the 
alleged perpetrator.  Danovsky also testified that at the 
conclusion of her interview with the Crofts, she was uncertain 
whether any sexual abuse had occurred. 
 The Crofts filed a complaint in the federal district 
court against Westmoreland County Children and Youth Services 
(WCCYS), Carla Danovsky and Westmoreland County.  They alleged 
that the defendants had impermissibly interfered with their 
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in the companionship of 
their daughter.   
 Defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint, 
which, since discovery had been completed, were considered as 
motions for summary judgment.  They argued that defendant 
Danovsky was entitled to qualified immunity for her actions and 
that the county and WCCYS enjoyed municipal immunity from the 
charges.  The court entered summary judgment against the Crofts 
on all three counts, asserting that the Crofts would 
impermissibly have the court elevate their right to freedom of 
intimate association above Defendants' obligation to protect 
children.  The Crofts timely appealed.2 
                                                 
          2We note that the Crofts are appealing the district 
court’s order with respect only to the County and the WCCYS, not 
as to Carla Danovsky.  Furthermore, the Crofts are only appealing 






 We recognize the constitutionally protected liberty 
interests that parents have in the custody, care and management 
of their children.  See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 258, 103 
S.Ct. 2985, 2991-92 (1983); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 
(8th Cir. 1987).  We also recognize that this interest is not 
absolute.  Martinez v. Mafchir, 35 F.3d 1486, 1490 (10th Cir. 
1994); Myers, 810 F.2d at 1462.  Indeed, this liberty interest in 
familial integrity is limited by the compelling governmental 
interest in the protection of children --- particularly where the 
children need to be protected from their own parents.  See Myers, 
810 F.2d at 1462.  The right to familial integrity, in other 
words, does not include a right to remain free from child abuse 
investigations.  Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 
1993). 
 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits the government from interfering in familial 
relationships unless the government adheres to the requirements 
of procedural and substantive due process.3  In determining 
whether the Crofts’ constitutionally protected interests were 
violated, we must balance the fundamental liberty interests of 
the family unit with the compelling interests of the state in 
                                                                                                                                                             
process issues. 
          3We note here only that the policy of removing the 
suspected parent from the family home during the pendency of 
child abuse investigations absent any procedural safeguards 





protecting children from abuse.  Whatever disruption or 
disintegration of family life the Croft’s may have suffered as a 
result of the county’s child abuse investigation does not, in and 
of itself, constitute a constitutional deprivation.  Watterson, 
987 F.2d at 8; see also Frazier v. Bailey, 957 F.2d 920, 931 (1st 
Cir. 1992).   
 We realize there may be cases in which a child services 
bureau may be justified in removing either a child or parent from 
the home, even where later investigation proves no abuse 
occurred.  However, a state has no interest in protecting 
children from their parents unless it has some reasonable and 
articulable evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a 
child has been abused or is in imminent danger of abuse.  See 
Lehr, 103 S.Ct. at 2990 (declaring liberty interests in 
preserving the family unit "are sufficiently vital to merit 
constitutional protection in appropriate cases") (emphasis 
added); accord Myers, 810 F.2d at 1462-63 (noting parental 
liberty interest in maintaining integrity of family unit is not a 
clearly established right where there is a "reasonable suspicion" 
abuse may have occurred).   
 Our focus here is whether the information available to 
the defendants at the time would have created an objectively 
reasonable suspicion of abuse justifying the degree of 
interference with the Crofts’ rights as Chynna’s parents.4  
                                                 
          4 This proposition is most often raised against 
government action that threatens to remove a child from his or 
her home.  Nonetheless, we can discern no rational distinction 





Absent such reasonable grounds, governmental intrusions of this 
type are arbitrary abuses of power. See Gottlieb v. County of 
Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 517 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding no due process 
violation for removing child where child welfare workers possess 
objectively reasonable basis for believing parental custody 
represents a threat to child's health or safety); Thomason v. 
SCAN Volunteer Services, Inc., 85 F.3d 1365, 1371 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(holding child care worker entitled to qualified immunity in § 
1983 action where he or she removes child on reasonable suspicion 
of child abuse); cf. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6324 and 23 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 6315 (providing for removing child from home only where 
there are reasonable grounds to believe the child suffers from 
injury, or is in imminent danger of injury from her 
surroundings); Myers, 810 F.2d at 1462-63 (noting parental 
liberty interest in maintaining integrity of family unit is not a 
clearly established right where there is a "reasonable suspicion" 
that abuse may have occurred). 
 Before the interviews, Danovsky possessed a six-fold  
hearsay report by an anonymous informant stating that the mother 
had told a friend that Dr. Croft had abused Chynna and that 
Chynna had recently been put out of the house naked, walked 
several miles, was found by a neighbor, and said she was sleeping 
with her parents.5 
                                                                                                                                                             
and arbitrarily separate parents from their children; or to 
deprive children of their liberty interests in continued 
companionship with their parents. 
          5The anonymous tip reported that "[T]he mother told a 





 Dr. Croft confirmed that an incident bearing only the 
barest resemblance to the anonymous tip had happened.  Far from 
corroborating the anonymous tip, the Crofts' statements raised 
serious questions about the veracity of the informant.  An 
anonymous tip may justify investigation but will not provide 
reasonable grounds for removal of a family member absent 
independent, articulable criteria of reliability; and certainly 
not when all evidence is to the contrary.  Cf. Alabama v. White, 
496 U.S. 325, 328, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2415 (1990) (anonymous tip, 
absent sufficient indicia of reliability, will not support 
reasonable suspicion necessary to justify stop-and-frisk); United 
States v. Roberson, 90 F.3d 75, 78 (3d Cir. 1996) (anonymous tip 
that only contains information readily observable at the time the 
tip is made does not supply reasonable suspicion to stop).   
 Danovsky was entitled to view the statements of an 
alleged perpetrator skeptically.  She was not, however, entitled 
to rely on the unknown credibility of an anonymous informant 
unless she could corroborate the information through other 
sources which would have reduced the chance that the informant 
was recklessly relating incorrect information or had purposely 
distorted information.  See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 
S.Ct. 2317, 2331 (1983) (anonymous tip, without other indicia of 
                                                                                                                                                             
 from the informant, to Childline, to Gerald Sopko, to Barbara 
Jollie, to Danovsky.  We recognize that child abuse will often be 
reported anonymously.  We additionally realize that such hearsay 
may often be the only available evidence to alert the child abuse 
investigators.  Anonymous informants, such as those who report 
suspected abuse on the Childline, are undoubtedly important in 





reliability, does not establish probable cause for search 
warrant).   
 Danovsky, in her deposition testimony, pointed to what 
she called "red flags" -- statements given during the interviews 
which raised questions in her mind about whether the tip was true 
-- as further justification for forcing Henry Croft from his 
home.  The red flags cited by Defendants are incapable of 
providing the necessary reasonable grounds.  For example, at one 
point during the interview, Dr. Croft told Danovsky that he had 
applied vaginal creams to Chynna when she had a rash, which 
Danovsky interpreted to mean that he regularly gave his daughter 
vaginal exams.  Likewise, Danovsky's reliance on supposed 
inconsistencies between the statements of Carol and Dr. Croft is 
without foundation.  None of the cited inconsistencies is 
evidence of child sexual abuse, nor did any of the statements in 
any way confirm the allegations of the anonymous tip.  Even 
considered together, minor inconsistencies which provide no 
affirmative evidence of sexual abuse cannot alone establish the 
objectively reasonable grounds necessary to remove a family 
member from the family unit. 
 Most damaging to Defendants is Danovsky's deposition 
testimony that, after the interviews, she had no opinion one way 
or the other whether sexual abuse had occurred.  Alternatively, 
Danovsky testified that she did not have enough information to 
make a determination and that further investigation was required. 





grounds, to any degree of certainty, that Chynna was sexually 
abused or was in imminent danger of abuse. She possessed no 
evidence of abuse beyond an anonymous tip.  Danovsky had no 
physical evidence of sexual abuse with which to base an opinion. 
 She was merely presented with an anonymous tip relating an 
incident which was reasonably explained by the accused parents.  
Record evidence establishes that Danovsky lacked any objective 
evidence of sexual abuse, and, indeed, that she had no belief 
that such abuse had occurred. 
 Considered in light of the circumstances surrounding 
the ultimatum, Danovsky's conduct was an arbitrary abuse of 
government power.  Based on her lack of an opinion regarding 
whether sexual abuse had occurred, we hold that she lacked 
objectively reasonable grounds to believe the child had been 
sexually abused or was in imminent danger of sexual abuse.  
Combined with the total absence of objective evidence which would 
support a belief that sexual abuse had occurred, we hold that 
Danovsky's conduct will certainly not support the grant of 
summary judgment in the Defendants’ favor.  Because the Crofts 
did not cross-file for summary judgment, we, sitting as a court 
of review, must remand the cause to the district court for 
further proceedings.6  
                                                 
     6While Judge Becker joins in the preceding portions of the 
opinion, he is not prepared at this juncture to hold that 
Danovsky’s conduct violated the Crofts’ constitutional rights, or 
that, on remand, the Crofts are entitled to an automatic summary 







 We will reverse the district court's entry of summary 
judgment.7   
 Costs will be taxed against the Appellee. 
                                                 
     7The Crofts have also raised questions of fact, inter alia, 
 whether an unconstitutional custom or policy existed; whether 
the relevant final policy makers for WCCYS and the County 
consciously or deliberately enacted, or acquiesced in, the custom 
or policy at issue; and, whether the custom or policy caused the 
violation of the Crofts’ constitutional rights.   
